

# Hong Kong Constitutional Reform: What do the People Want?

A public opinion survey on Hong Kong people's attitudes towards Hong Kong's constitutional reform.

Commissioned by Civic Exchange



Conducted by

 1982–2007 **The Hong Kong Transition Project**

December 2005

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## Executive Summary

1. Support for directly electing the Chief Executive continues strong. The dispute over the reform package appears to have moved about one in five toward a “neutral” or “don’t know” response. Opposition to the principle of direct CE election has not increased during the dispute above about 1 in 10 though support for direct CE election has diminished marginally from 8 in 10 to 7 in 10 when the question is posed in principle. Finding 7 below shows that when exposed to various other options, 78 percent prefer direct universal suffrage election of the CE, though when forced to choose the option they support most, 68 percent choose direct election. The range of support under all conditions for direct CE election is thus between 68 percent and 78 percent. Opposition in principle to direct CE election is concentrated among those born in Hong Kong aged 60 and up, less educated, and retired from the workforce.
2. In contrast to opposition to directly electing the CE, opposition to directly electing all members of Legco has grown over the past two years, from 14 percent in November 2003 to 22 percent in November 2005.
3. In the November 2005 survey, 57 percent supported both direct CE elections and direct Legco elections in principle. 8 percent of the sample opposed both in principle. 35 percent of those polled supported one type of direct election while opposing the other, or responded neutral or don’t know on one or both principles. Those who support both reforms are 59 percent of all men in the sample and 55 percent of women, while opponents of both are 9 percent of the men sampled and 6 percent of women.
4. Of demographic variables examined, all breakdowns showed a majority supporting both principles of CE and all direct Legco elections except: those aged 70 and up; those with a primary grade 6 or less education; those professing to be Buddhists or Taoists, those with approximate family monthly incomes below \$9,999; and those who lived in mainland China at least a year of their lives (most came to Hong Kong as adults).
5. A clear majority of 68 percent support a timetable being given for the direct election of all members of Legco while one in five oppose a timeline.
6. A majority appear willing to accept the government’s reform proposals, even while most desire various changes in them and even while large majorities support full direct universal suffrage elections of the CE and Legco.
7. Only 37 percent support rejecting the government’s expansion proposal for the CE Election Committee and retaining the present size and voting arrangements. No option for change secures a majority of support except universal suffrage direct election by all Hong Kong voters, which 78 percent support. Asked which of five options they most prefer, 68 percent choose direct CE election by all Hong Kong voters.
8. The plan as proposed to expand Legco to 70 with District Councils returning 5 new functional constituency seats has most support of all options with two thirds in favor. Expanding as proposed but abolishing corporate voting has 51 percent in favor. All the other options fail to get a majority of support, including making no changes and keeping Legco as it is now.

9. Support for proposals to separate the functional constituencies from the geographic or directly elected constituencies into separate houses (like the US Senate from the House) has risen from 47 to 51 percent support from a year ago. Opposition has grown from 22 percent to 27 percent.
10. There may be indications that strong support for full direct election of all members of Legco and for direct elections in principle has eroded support for expanding functional constituency (FC) franchises. Whereas a year ago 78 percent supported expanding FC franchises, only 51 percent do so now. Opposition to expansion has more than doubled, from 14 percent in December 2004 to 33 percent now.
11. Comparing dissatisfaction before the 2000 Legco election and before the 2004 Legco election to today shows that only the Democratic Party, the Frontier and Article 45 show rises in dissatisfaction from the August 2004 level. In contrast to September 2004 when all the top three in dissatisfaction were pro-government parties led by the DAB, today the Democratic party is number one in dissatisfaction followed by a much improved DAB and then by the Frontier. Clearly the pro-democracy parties' hardline confrontative stance is having some effect on their standing with the public even prior to the vote on 21 December.
12. In sum, a definite majority of Hong Kongers support direct elections for both the Chief Executive and Legco, want those elections to take place by 2012, and will blame Donald Tsang, Beijing and the democrats if steps forward toward full democracy fail to be made in 2007-08.

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**The number of respondents in the HKTP surveys:**

# Hong Kong

## Constitutional Reform

### *What do the People Want?*

Commissioned by Civic-Exchange, Hong Kong's independent think tank, and conducted<sup>1</sup> by the Hong Kong Transition Project, a long term, multi-national, multi-disciplinary study of Hong Kong people's political and economic transition from foreign subjects to SAR citizens.<sup>2</sup>

#### **I Context**

The primary issue of Hong Kong's transition from British colonial subjects to citizens of the Special Administrative Region of the Peoples Republic of China has been whether, and when, Hong Kong people would gain the full rights and privileges of citizenship. Never during Hong Kong's 156-year colonial period did its residents gain the normal rights of citizens to elect their executive or to amend their constitutional documents. Universal suffrage elections for local bodies, the District Boards, now District Councils, began only in 1982. The first, partial universal suffrage elections for the Legislative Council (Legco) began in 1991 with 18 legislators returned by direct election, the same number appointed by the governor, David Wilson, 3 ex officio members (plus the governor if and when he chose to attend) and 21 by functional constituencies to the 60-member body. Today Legco is half universal suffrage elected, half functionally elected from limited franchises requiring special qualifications. In April 2004 the Standing Committee of the NPC explicitly forbade the people to amend the constitution to permit full universal suffrage election of the Chief Executive and all Legco members.

Both rights, electing the executive and amending the constitution, the normal rights of citizens in democratic countries, were promised in the Basic Law, a constitution promulgated not by an act of Hong Kong's elected representatives nor by vote of a specially elected constituent assembly but by the National People's Congress of the PRC well before Hong Kong returned to Chinese sovereignty. While the NPC had Hong Kong "representatives" on it, they were few of many and all chosen by the Chinese Communist Party rather than by vote of the people. The Basic Law constitution was negotiated as part of a process laid out by treaty between the two sovereign powers. The Sino-British Declaration of December 1984 outlined principles whereas the Basic Law, promulgated in April 1990, codified these principles into constitutive powers and responsibilities. Neither the Declaration nor the Basic Law ever were subjected to a referendum of the Hong Kong people. In effect, the Hong Kong people were given a promissory note for full citizenship in future in exchange

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<sup>1</sup> The November 2005 survey of 859 permanent residents was conducted from 1-8 November and 18-20 November, in two rounds. Any significant differences in results between the two rounds of the Nov 2005 survey are noted below. At the 95 percent confidence interval, range of error is +/- 4 points. All results are rounded to the nearest whole number following WAPOR public survey guidelines. See end for number of respondents for each survey.

<sup>2</sup> Christine Loh is Civic Exchange's Chief Executive Officer. The Hong Kong Transition Project is directed by Michael E. DeGolyer, Professor of Government & International Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University. See <http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktip> or <http://www.civic-exchange.org> and end of this report for further information.



for their implied consent in 1997 to a change of sovereignty. If they did not like these conditions, they could leave. Half a million did prior to 1997.

The “ultimate aim” according to the Basic Law was for the Chief Executive (CE) and all Legco members to be returned by universal suffrage elections. Toward that end, the Basic Law laid out a timetable of change from 1997 to 2007-08, after which, according to a nominal reading of the provisions in the law, the Hong Kong people themselves could decide on the steps to achieve those aims for the legislature and, in conference with the Central Peoples Government, the same for election of the CE. This ability to decide the way and pace forward was understood as a key component of Deng Xiaoping’s promises of a “high degree of autonomy” and for the realization of “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong.” Believing that ultimately, as stated in the Basic Law, promises of no change in their way of life and of progressive change in their form of government would be honored, most Hong Kongers were willing to wait and see.

Over time, what began as promises by their new rulers have become taken by the people as writ, and increasingly, as overdue. Dismayed by promises of reform and accountability in Tung Chee-hwa’s vaunted Principal Officials Accountability System which accomplished neither, and heartened by results of taking matters into their own hands in massive numbers on the streets and at the polls in 2003 and 2004 which eventually drove the deeply distrusted Tung from office, Hong Kongers have become increasingly impatient with continued delay and incremental reforms in which the increments toward full direct elections and full democratic citizenship are too small and too infrequent. The unilateral intervention of the NPC Standing Committee, which has asserted it has the power to “interpret” the Basic Law in any way it pleases any time it wants, in April 2004 was meant to explicitly check growing pressures to substantially advance toward full direct election of the CE in 2007 and Legco in 2008. While the CE Election Committee could expand from its present 800 members, the ruling forbade direct election. And while Legco could be expanded and franchises adjusted, the ratio of half functionally elected from restricted franchises and half directly elected by universal suffrage was not to be changed for the 2008 elections. Donald Tsang, Tung’s successor, put forward proposals in the Constitutional Reform Task Force Fifth Report in October 2005 in conformity with those restrictions. While more progressive than those expected under Tung, they appear to fall short of Hong Kong people’s desires. Nevertheless, a majority appear willing to accept the proposals, even while most desire various changes to them and even while large majorities support, in principle, full direct universal suffrage elections of the CE and Legco.

This report will lay out support or opposition to the principle of direct elections. Second, support or opposition to specific aspects of the proposals and likely provisions to be voted on as amendments to the election ordinances for CE and Legco. Third, the effects of the debate on the government and various parties. Finally, fallout effects if reforms fail to be made for the 2007-08 elections.

## **II Public opinion on principles**


Beijing and Hong Kong officials have long asserted that a “consensus” on direct elections was the necessary condition for progressing beyond the steps detailed in the Basic Law. First examined in this section, whether there is a consensus on direct election of the CE in principle. Then, whether a consensus exists for the principle of directly electing all members of Legco. Third in this section, a look at the characteristics of those who oppose and support both principles. Finally, when people would like to see the principle of direct election of the CE and Legco implemented.

### 1. Direct Election of the Chief Executive

A consensus of support for the principle of directly electing the CE is a principle that has long been supported by margins of two thirds or more, with only about one in ten opposed, despite the SC’s ruling out of direct election of the CE in 2007, and despite the replacement of the very unpopular Tung with the very popular Tsang as CE. Support for directly electing the CE continued strong throughout 2005. The dispute over the reform package does appear to have moved a portion of the public toward a “neutral” or “don’t know” response. Clearly, however, opposition to the principle of direct CE election has NOT increased during the dispute though support has diminished somewhat.

**Table 1 In principle, do you support or oppose direct election of the Chief Executive?<sup>3</sup>**

	Nov 2003	Dec 2004	May 2005	Nov 2005
Strongly support	33	20	33	22
Support	48	54	42	47
Neutral/DK	6	10	11	19
Oppose	11	13	11	10
Strongly oppose	2	3	3	2



If those NOT opposed are deemed to be in favor or at least accepting, a consensus exists now, in principle, for the direct election of the Chief Executive. This consensus dominates all age groups except those in their 70s and up, though a majority even of that age support direct election.


<sup>3</sup> All Figures are in percentages unless otherwise stated. The Hong Kong Transition Project has project members at Hong Kong Baptist University, University of Macau, City University and Lingnan University. The Hong Kong Transition Project is funded via a competitive grant from the Research Grants Council of the University Grants Committee of the Hong Kong Government (HKBU 2033/01H). None of the institutions mentioned above is responsible for any of the views expressed herein.

**Table 2: Support/Oppose CE direct election by Age group**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-83	total
Support	79	71	73	69	64	64	57	69
Neutral/DK	14	21	14	18	22	17	28	19
Opposed	8	9	13	13	14	19	15	13
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
Chi-square = 15.13 with 12 df p = 0.2345

**Chart: Table 2 Support/Oppose CE direct election by Age group**



While the differences among age groups are too small to be statistically significant overall, there is a pattern of distinction in Table 2/Chart 2 which should be noted.<sup>4</sup> Social scientists have developed a concept called “generational imprinting” based on research that shows that significant events, such as the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen Massacre or 9-11-2001 terrorist attacks on the US, sear in attitudes and emotions that have a lifelong perceptual impact. Usually, those between the ages of 15 and 30 are most susceptible to this generational imprinting. The pattern of responses above shows that opposition to direct elections is much stronger among those in their 60s while those in their 70s are least supportive of direct elections. Assuming that political attitudes are most susceptible to generational imprinting between ages 15-30 means that something significant happened in the 1960s which affected these ages enough to turn them more against direct elections than other age groups which had no such formative experiences. On the mainland, Maoist “democracy” prevailed during the Cultural Revolution of 1965-1975, a decade reviled by many for its political upheavals and wanton destruction by mobs of Red Guards. The Cultural Revolution upheavals seem to have very

<sup>4</sup> Chi-square is a measure of association. The lower the Chi-square number, i.e., the nearer zero in the number after the symbol p under each table, the less likely that the distribution of responses is a result of just random variation. Chi-square reliably shows an association at .05 or less. However, Chi-square is less useful when only small groups show wide variation from the results of other groups. Those in their 60s and 70s make up only 13.6 percent of the Nov 2005 survey sample, so their variance would have to be extraordinarily large to affect the overall calculations of Chi-square, which deals with variances among every group and within the overall sample.


deeply affected the attitudes of those born in Hong Kong among this age group particularly, most of whom at an impressionable age contrasted their relative peace, prosperity and security with the opposite going on next door. Riots took place in Hong Kong from 1966 to 1967, with continued local outbreaks of violence up to 1973. Most in Hong Kong attributed this violence to attempts by pro-Maoist leftists to destabilize Hong Kong enough to provoke the Peoples Liberation Army to invade. Opposition to direct election of the CE leaps among the Hong Kong born in the impressionable age groups during the Cultural Revolution and concomitant unrest in Hong Kong. These opponents, now in their 60s and up, are a rapidly diminishing obstacle to reform.

**Table 3 HONG KONG BORN Support/Oppose CE direct election by Age group**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-83	total
Support	80	69	74	71	68	55	54	70
Neutral/DK	10	21	13	17	22	23	15	18
Opposed	10	10	12	13	10	23	31	12
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 14.18 with 12 df p = 0.2893



There was in November as in earlier surveys differences between those who stated they had voted (in this case, Sept 2004's Legco election) and those who had not voted or were not registered to vote, but the margins are fairly small, 70 percent of voters in support of CE direct election versus 67 percent of non-voters.

**Table 4 Support for direct election of Chief Executive by voter status**

Nov 2005	Non-voters	Voters	total
Strongly support	17	26	22
Support	50	44	47
Neutral/DK	20	18	19
Oppose	11	9	10
Strongly oppose	2	3	2
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 12.87 with 4 df p = 0.0119

In terms of religious affiliation, Buddhists and Taoists are least supportive and most opposed to direct CE election. Catholics and protestants (combined as Christian) are most supportive.

**Table 5 Support for direct election of Chief Executive by Religion**

	None	Christian	Buddhist/Taoist	Ancestor worship	total
Support	68	77	57	68	69
Neutral/DK	19	14	26	21	19
Opposed	13	9	18	11	12
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 10.80 with 6 df p = 0.0948


Support for direct CE election in principle tends to rise with education attainment.

**Table 6 Support for direct election of Chief Executive by Education**

	0-6 Primary	F1-F4	F5	F6-Univ2/US3	Univ grad	Univ Post-grad	total
Support	57	69	68	73	72	75	69
Neutral/DK	32	20	19	15	15	17	19
Opposed	11	11	13	13	14	8	12
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 16.58 with 10 df p = 0.0842



Opposition to direct CE election in principle is concentrated among managers and administrators and retirees.

**Table 7 Support for direct election of Chief Executive by Occupational group**

	1	2-3	4	5&7	6-8-9	10	11	12-15	13-14	total
Support	66	74	72	75	60	70	61	66	70	68
Neutral/DK	11	18	21	10	33	21	19	20	17	19
Oppose	23	8	7	15	8	9	20	14	13	13
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>


table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 35.89 with 16 df p = 0.0030

**KEY: Occupational groups (Recoded)**

Group	Count	%
1 <b>Managers/Administrators</b>	89	11
2-3 <b>Professionals/Assoc. Prof.</b>	90	11
4 <b>Clerks/Secretaries</b>	114	14
5-7 <b>Service/Sales/Craft/Police/Fire</b>	68	8
6-8-9 <b>Ag&amp;Fisheries/Machine Op/Elementary</b>	77	9
10 <b>Housewives</b>	126	15
11 <b>Retired</b>	111	13
12-15 <b>Unemployed/Other</b>	59	7
13-14 <b>Students/Educators</b>	105	13

**Chart: Table 7 Support for direct election of Chief Executive by Occupational group**



Opposition to direct CE election is strongest among homeowners and lowest among those who rent or live in village houses. Public housing tenants are not significantly more supportive than other groups and significantly less supportive than private renters.

**Table 8 Support for direct election of Chief Executive by Living quarters**

	1-9-10	2	3	4	5	6-7-8	total
Support	71	69	83	64	68	70	69
Neutral/DK	17	15	12	22	23	24	19
Oppose	13	16	5	14	9	6	12
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
Chi-square = 20.82 with 10 df p = 0.0224

**KEY: Living Quarters**

Group	Count	%
1-9-10 Villa/Employer provided qtrs/other	24	3
2 Private residence (own)	368	43
3 Private residence (rent)	57	7
4 Home Ownership Scheme	130	15
5 Public housing	247	29
6-7-8 Modern/traditional village house	33	4

Opposition to direct CE election in principle appears highest among the lowest and highest income groups. With retirees dominating lower income groups and managers and administrators (who also tend to be older) dominating higher income groups, this result appears related more to occupational or former occupational and educational and/or generational experiences than based in income-centered interests.

**Table 9 Support for direct election of Chief Executive by Income**

	1-2	3	4	5	6-7	8-9	10-11	12-13-14-15-16	Refuse to say	total
Support	60	62	71	76	70	71	68	70	67	69
Neutral/DK	19	26	19	21	17	18	17	12	21	19
Oppose	22	12	11	4	13	11	15	18	12	12
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
Chi-square = 19.07 with 16 df p = 0.2648

**KEY: Income groups (Recoded for analysis. See full breakdown in demographic section)**

Group	Approx. mthly family income	Count	%
1-2	Less than \$5,000	65	8
3	\$5,000-9,999	76	9
4	\$10,000-14,999	113	13
5	\$15,000-19,999	83	10
6-7	\$20,000-29,999	134	16
8-9	\$30,000-39,999	111	13
10-11	\$40,000-59,999	94	11
12-13-14-15-16	\$60,000-100,000+	73	8
<b>Refuse to say</b>		<b>110</b>	<b>13</b>

Living outside Hong Kong (a matter of life experience and education, and another form of generational imprinting for many individuals), particularly in democratic countries or in mainland China, makes a difference in support. Interestingly, those who lived in democracies overseas, while the most supportive in principle of direct CE election, are also the most opposed.

**Table 10 Support for direct election of Chief Executive by Experience living outside HK**

	Mainland China	None	UK-US-Can-Aust-Twn-OtherDem	total
Support	58	70	73	69
Neutral/DK	30	19	9	19
Oppose	13	12	18	13
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
Chi-square = 16.61 with 4 df p = 0.0023

The question on whether one would seek to leave Hong Kong if unsuitable changes take place is also a dividing point, with those responding yes much more supportive of direct election. This means that, at some point, failure to democratize could see a rise in emigration. (see below for more)

**Table 11 Support for direct election of Chief Executive by Would leave on unsuitable changes**

	Yes/Would like to	No	total
Support	75	64	70
Neutral/DK	15	20	18
Oppose	10	16	12
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>


table contents: Percent of Column Total  
Chi-square = 12.79 with 2 df p = 0.0017

Self identification more with China also shows correlation with support for direct CE election. See Table 13 for trends in identification, which shows a drop in Hong Kong British as an identity, but less change toward a simple Chinese or Hong Kong Chinese identity than one might expect.

**Table 12 Support for direct election of Chief Executive by self-identification**

	Chinese	HK Chinese	HK person	HK British/Overseas Chinese/Other	total
Support	60	66	75	82	70
Neutral/DK	18	19	20	13	18
Oppose	21	15	5	4	12
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>


table contents: Percent of Column Total  
Chi-square = 40.70 with 6 df p ≤ 0.0001





**Table 13** The following is a list of how you might describe yourself. Which is the most appropriate description of you? Trend table.

	Chinese	HK Chinese	HK people	HK British	Overseas Chinese	Others
Feb 93	19	36	37	7		1
Aug 93	20	34	35	10		1
Feb 94	21	40	28	8		1
Aug 94	19	38	32	10		1
Feb 95	20	32	35	11		1
Aug 95	22	32	36	8		1
Feb 96	30	28	35	5		2
July 96	30	20	45	3		2
Feb 97	30	28	35	3	3	1
June 97	25	24	44	4	2	1
Jan 98	27	27	39	3	2	2
Apr 98	30	24	41	2	2	2
July 98	22	27	44	4	1	1
Oct 98	25	27	43	4	1	1
Apr 99	20	28	45	3	1	2
July 99	21	27	46	4	1	1
Nov 99	23	27	44	3	1	2
Apr 00	24	30	39	4	1	2
Aug 00	22	27	45	4	2	1
Nov 00	24	28	42	3	2	2
Apr 01	28	24	42	3	2	2
July 01	26	26	43	3	1	2
Nov 2001	22	26	45	4	1	2
Apr 2002	27	24	43	3	1	2
Aug 2002	28	24	44	2	1	1
Nov 2002	24	25	44	2	1	3
Nov 2003	22	27	44	2	2	4
Dec 2003	25	25	45	3	1	2
Apr 2004	26	27	41	2	1	2
May 2005	25	29	42	1	1	1
July 2005	22	31	41	2	1	2
Nov 2005	29	27	39	2	2	2




The correlation of self-identity and willingness to leave Hong Kong on unsuitable change is shown in Table 14 and the chart. The local and central government appear to believe that raising the level of identity with China and fostering stronger patriotism toward China would strengthen support for their policies. On the other hand, as shown below, there is also a case to be made that changing their policies or being willing to change their policies would have the effect of fostering patriotism and stronger identity with China.

**Table 14 Would leave or not by self-identification**

	Chinese	HK Chinese	HK person	HK British/Overseas Chinese/Other	total
Would leave	42	48	56	67	50
Not leave	58	52	44	33	50
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 15.75 with 3 df p = 0.0013



Clearly, Table 15 shows that attempts to increase patriotism since 1997 have had little effect.

**Table 15 How does the celebration of 1<sup>st</sup> October National Day make you feel?**

	July 1998	July 1999	Nov 1999	Nov 2000	Nov 2001	Nov 2004	Nov 2005
Indifferent	70	58	52	51	55	59	57
Proud	7	12	12	9	12	12	12
Excited	8	7	12	8	7	8	8
Another public holiday	11	20	21	30	23	17	20
Uneasy/Unhappy	2	1	3	2	2	2	2
Refuse/DK	1	2	1	-	1	2	2

However, Table 16 and 17 contrast questions related to patriotism asked in 1998, one year after the handover, with the same questions, asked in 2005, eight years on. Clearly, attitudes have shifted toward more support for patriotic activities such as singing the national anthem. However, as shown above in Table 15, patriotic pride on China’s national day has not grown, calling into question whether education meant to boost patriotism are having much effect. A new direction may be in order, that of building consensus not by boosting patriotism, but by being willing to heed public opinion and change policy, as Table 18 and following examine.

**Table 16 Do you support or oppose the schools to teach: (JULY 2005)**

	Strongly support	Support	Neutral	oppose	Strongly oppose	DK
civic education	22	58	12	2	--	6
Basic law	11	55	17	8	1	7
PRC’s pol history to present	15	60	11	6	1	6
Patriotic school plays or lessons	6	44	22	19	2	7
To sing national anthem and have flag raising every day	5	26	26	32	7	4

**Table 17 Do you support or oppose the schools to teach: (JULY 1998)**

	Strongly support	Support	Neutral	oppose	Strongly oppose	DK
civic education	28	47	14	3	3	4
Basic law	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
PRC’s pol history to present	21	52	12	3	8	4
Patriotic school plays or lessons	8	35	24	22	7	5
To sing national anthem and have flag raising every day	4	16	23	37	17	2

**Chart Comparative 1998 to 2005 Do you support or oppose the schools to teach**




Table 18 begins with a comparison between the colonial government and what people anticipated the SAR government would be like in response to public opinion. Obviously, people were afraid the incoming government would be even more intransigent. In part, the first five years of Tung Chee-hwa’s regime were a relief to such pessimism, as can be seen in the April 2002 figures. But these were also affected positively as he promised more sensitivity to public opinion under the POAS or principal official’s accountability system. The Nov 2002 and June 2003 responses show deepening pessimism, with the June 2003 responses being the most negative recorded during Tung’s term prior to the huge 1 July 2003 march which saw abrupt about turns in government policy and a rise in public protest as a means of pressuring government. Tung’s resignation in March 2005, as shown in the May 2005 results, significantly raised expectations that public opinion would be heeded, for the first time, higher than at any time under colonialism.

**Table 18 If many HK people disagree with certain policies of the HK government, (SAR government) do you think they would change or modify those policies?**

	Patten Colonial Gov	SAR anticipated	SAR 1 <sup>st</sup> 5yrs	POAS system	Before 1 July Protest	After SC Intervention	Cnstitutional reform proposal
	July 96	July 96	April 02	Nov 02	June 03	May 04	Nov 05
Yes	17	9	18	15	10	12	29
Maybe	14	9	19	16	19	20	18
Can't say	13	15	16	15	14	17	21
Maybe not	5	6	10	10	13	10	6
No	43	50	30	38	37	30	20
DK	8	11	6	6	7	12	7




Table 19 shows responses recoded in order to better test response relationships.

**Table 19 If many HK people disagree with certain policies of the HK government, do you think they would change or modify those policies? (Nov 2005) Reclassified.**

Group	Count	%
Yes/Maybe yes	401	47
Hard to say/DK	238	28
No/Maybe not	220	27

Those who answer No and Yes on government changing its policies if public opinion objects show the strongest level of support for direct election of the CE in principle. Those answering no may more strongly support direct election in principle in order to increase the public's say in setting policies. Those answering yes are somewhat less supportive of direct election, as might be expected if this is true. But those saying the government listens to public opinion also support direct CE election, with more than two thirds in support (No respondents are three fourths in support). Clearly, direct election of the CE is about more than heeding public opinion. It may also be about belief that direct election would improve government, even increase the ability of the CE to push policies and change civil service attitudes and behaviors.

**Table 20 Will HK Gov change policies if public oppose by support/oppose direct CE election**

	Yes/Maybe yes	Hard to say/DK	No/Maybe not	total
Support	69	60	78	69
Neutral/DK	19	26	12	19
Oppose	12	15	11	12
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
Chi-square = 18.81 with 4 df p = 0.0009




Table 21 shows that belief that government heeds or rejects public opinion has no effect on whether people would seek to leave Hong Kong if unsuitable changes occurred.

**Table 21 Willingness to leave by Gov willing to change if public oppose**

	Yes/Maybe yes	Hard to say/DK	No/Maybe not	total
Would leave	54	43	53	50
Would not leave	47	57	47	50
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>


table contents: Percent of Column Total  
Chi-square = 7.123 with 2 df p = 0.0284

However, as Table 22 shows, those willing to leave to Hong Kong for quality of life and economic reasons are more likely to believe the government heeds public opinion than those who cite political reasons to leave. And though those citing political reasons are lowest in negative responses on government’s unwillingness to listen to public opinion, they are by far the most uncertain about this. Successful constitutional reform which heeds public views may be the best tactic to address this group’s willingness to leave.

**Table 22 Gov willing to change if public oppose by reasons to leave HK**

	Economic reasons	Political reasons	Quality of life reasons	total
Yes/Maybe yes	52	46	61	51
Hard to say/DK	17	33	10	22
No/Maybe not	31	21	29	27
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
Chi-square = 17.10 with 4 df p = 0.0018



Section 2 turns to a similar analysis of supporters and opponents of direct elections of all Legco members in principle while Section 3 looks at those who support or oppose both principles.

**2. Legco Direct Election, support/oppose in principle**

In contrast to opposition to the principle of directly electing the CE, opposition in principle to directly electing all members of Legco has grown over the past two years, from 14 percent in November 2003 to 22 percent in November 2005. At the same time, respondents more strongly support direct election of all Legco members in principle (72 percent) than support direct election of the CE in principle (69 percent).

**Table 23 In principle, do you support or oppose direct election of all Legco seats?**

	Nov 2003	Dec 2004	Nov 2005
Strongly support	29	21	24
Support	48	52	48
Neutral/DK	9	9	6
Oppose	13	16	18
Strongly oppose	1	3	4





Table 24 shows that opposition to the principle of directly electing all Legco members differs by age groups from that regarding the CE. Opposition is strongest among teenagers and those in their 50s.

**Table 24 Support/oppose in principle direct election of all Legco seats by Age group**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-83	total
Support	67	80	76	78	62	68	63	73
Oppose	31	15	20	18	30	23	24	22
Neutral/DK	2	5	5	4	8	9	13	6
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
Chi-square = 27.85 with 12 df p = 0.0058




Unlike election for the CE, Christians are not the strongest supporters of direct election of all Legco members. Traditional Chinese answers of none or ancestor worship show higher levels of support. As before, Buddhists and Taoists are least supportive of the direct election principle.

**Table 25 Support/oppose in principle direct election of all Legco seats by Religion**

	None	Christian	Buddhist/Taoist	Ancestor worship	total
Support	74	72	56	77	73
Oppose	21	23	32	17	22
Neutral/DK	5	5	11	6	6
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 11.60 with 6 df p = 0.0716



While more highly educated persons show more support for the principle of direct election applied to Legco, as they did with the CE, opposition appears more evenly distributed.

**Table 26 Support/oppose in principle direct election of all Legco seats by Education**

	Primary 0-6	F1-F4	F5	F6-Univ2/US3	Univ grad	Univ Post-grad	total
Support	65	73	69	76	77	79	73
Oppose	19	21	25	19	21	17	22
Neutral/DK	16	5	6	5	2	4	6
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 26.06 with 10 df p = 0.0037

Table 27 shows opposition also appears more evenly distributed by occupation for the principle of directly electing all Legco members than with the CE.



**Table 27 Support/oppose in principle direct election of all Legco seats by Occupation**

	1	2-3	4	5&7	6-8-9	10	11	12-15	13-14	total
Support	75	81	73	78	65	72	63	70	75	72
Oppose	20	18	22	21	26	19	26	24	21	22
Neutral/DK	4	1	5	1	9	9	11	7	4	6
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
Chi-square = 20.84 with 16 df p = 0.1848

**KEY: Occupational groups (Recoded)**

	Group	Count	%
1	<b>Managers/Administrators</b>	89	11
2-3	<b>Professionals/Assoc. Prof.</b>	90	11
4	<b>Clerks/Secretaries</b>	114	14
5-7	<b>Service/Sales/Craft/Police/Fire</b>	68	8
6-8-9	<b>Ag&amp;Fisheries/Machine Op/Elementary</b>	77	9
10	<b>Housewives</b>	126	15
11	<b>Retired</b>	111	13
12-15	<b>Unemployed/Other</b>	59	7
13-14	<b>Students/Educators</b>	105	13

Table 28 shows that the closer someone is to the workforce, the more likely they are to support direct election of all Legco members.

**Table 28 Support/oppose in principle direct election of all Legco by Work/non-work groups**

	Workforce	Student/Unemployed	Housewives	Retired	total
Support	74	74	72	63	72
Oppose	21	22	19	26	22
Neutral/DK	5	4	9	11	6
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
Chi-square = 11.25 with 6 df p = 0.0809


In terms of work sector, as the chart below makes very clear, civil servants or quasi-public employees are most opposed to direct election of all Legco members in principle. This group has a significant influence in several of the functional constituencies which have small franchises.

**Table 29 Support/oppose in principle direct election of all Legco seats by Work sector**

	Private sector	NGO	Civil servant/Quasi-public	Non-workforce	total
Support	75	78	70	70	72
Oppose	21	22	26	22	22
Neutral/DK	5	0	5	8	6
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
Chi-square = 6.452 with 6 df p = 0.3745

**Chart: Table 29 Support/oppose in principle direct election of all Legco seats by Work sector**




As with elections for the CE, living in a democratic country for a year or more increases support for direct election of Legco members. Unlike with the CE, there is not a higher proportion opposed to the principle than with other groups.

**Table 30 Support/oppose in principle direct election of all Legco seats by Lived abroad**

	Mainland China	None	UK-US-Can-Aust-Twn-OtherDem	total
Support	63	73	78	72
Oppose	18	23	19	22
Neutral/DK	18	5	3	6
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 28.41 with 4 df p ≤ 0.0001



There are also differences in attitude toward CE election and Legco among income groups, with higher income groups more likely to support the principle of directly electing all Legco members, and significantly less opposition than most other income groups.

**Table 31 Support/oppose in principle direct election of all Legco seats by Income**


	1-2	3	4	5	6-7	8-9	10-11	12-13-14-15-16	Refuse to say	total
Support	63	59	73	81	73	74	76	81	69	72
Oppose	23	28	20	16	23	23	22	16	23	22
Neutral/DK	14	13	7	4	4	3	2	3	8	6
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 30.57 with 16 df p = 0.0153

**KEY: Income groups (Recoded for analysis. See full breakdown in demographic section)**

Group	Approx. mthly family income	Count	%
1-2	<b>Less than \$5,000</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>8</b>
3	<b>\$5,000-9,999</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>9</b>
4	<b>\$10,000-14,999</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>13</b>
5	<b>\$15,000-19,999</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>10</b>
6-7	<b>\$20,000-29,999</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>16</b>
8-9	<b>\$30,000-39,999</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>13</b>
10-11	<b>\$40,000-59,999</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>11</b>
12-13-14-15-16	<b>\$60,000-100,000+</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Refuse to say</b>		<b>110</b>	<b>13</b>



Having examined attitudes toward the principle of directly electing the CE and of all members of Legco separately, the question of who are the consistent supporters and opponents of both principles arises. These are the people who have the strongest views and are the ones putting the most pressures on the government for change or no change. Section 3 examines these two polarized groups in detail.


### 3. Characteristics of supporters and opponents of reforms

In the survey in November 2005, 57 percent supported both direct CE elections and direct Legco elections in principle. Only 8 percent of the sample opposed both in principle. This means 35 percent of those polled supported one type of direct election while opposing the other, or who responded neutral or don't know on one or both principles. We look in the next section at the polar opposites, those who oppose or support both principles. The following tables compare the characteristics of all respondents in the survey conducted in November 2005 with supporters and opponents respectively.

Those who support both reforms are 59 percent of all men in the sample and 55 percent of women, while opponents of both are 9 percent of the men sampled and 6 percent of women.

**Table 32 Support both/oppose both by SEX<sup>5</sup>**

	Of 100% of Men	Of 100% Women	Of 100% of respondents
Support both	59	55	57
Oppose both	9	6	8



The table below shows that men dominate those who oppose direct elections while those who support direct elections differ not at all from the sample.

<sup>5</sup> NOTE: percentage numbers in demographic characteristic tables do not add up to 100 since these show of all in a certain demographic category such as sex, age, etc, how many support both direct election of the CE and of all Legco members or how many oppose both.


**Table 33 SEX breakdown of support both/oppose both groups**

	All respondents	Support both	Oppose both
Male	48	48	57
Female	52	52	43
Total	100	100	100

While those in their 60s have the highest percentage opposing both CE and Legco direct elections in principle, those in their 70s are least supportive with 46 percent of those in their 70s supporting both. In contrast, those in their 20s, 30s and 40s have 61 percent in support of both principles.

**Table 34 Age groups by Support both/oppose**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-83	Of 100% of respondents
Support both	54	61	61	61	49	55	46	57
Oppose both	4	4	7	6	10	15	11	8




As education levels rise, the percentage of supporters of direct elections in principle rises, from 46 percent of those with only primary education to two thirds of post-graduates. None of the 24 post-graduates opposed both in principle. (See chart, next page).

**Table 35 Education group by Support both/oppose both**

	Primary0-6	F1-F4	F5	F6-Univ2/US3	Univ grad	Univ Post-grad	total
Support both	46	58	54	58	63	67	57
Oppose both	8	6	8	6	10	0	8


**Chart Table 35 Education group by Support both/oppose both**



The full details of each level of education and number sampled appears in the demographic section of this report (at end). Religious preferences show the greatest support for the principle of direct election is among Christians as well as the least opposition while Buddhists/Taoists show the least support for the principle of direct election (42 percent) and the greatest opposition (13 percent).

**Table 36 Religious groups by Support both/oppose both**


	None	Christian	Buddhist/Taoist	Ancestor worship	total
Support both	58	60	42	57	57
Oppose both	9	4	13	5	8



The least support and strongest resistance to both principles is among retirees.

**Table 37 Work/non-work sectors by Support both/oppose both**

	Housewives	Retired	Student/Unemployed	Workforce	total
Support both	56	51	54	59	57
Oppose both	4	15	4	8	8



**Table 38 Work and Non-work sectors (of Nov 2005 sample)**

Group	Count	%
Housewives	126	15
Retired	111	13
Student/Unemployed	118	14
Workforce	484	58

Occupations with the lowest opposition to the principles of directly electing the CE and all Legco members are clerks and secretaries while retirees are the strongest objectors, just ahead of managers and administrators (i.e., business and civil service senior ranks).


**Table 39 Occupational groups by Support both/oppose both**

	1	2-3	4	5-7	6-8-9	10	11	12-15	13-14	total
Support both	56	67	57	65	51	56	51	53	57	57
Oppose both	11	6	3	9	8	4	15	8	7	8

**KEY: Occupational groups (Recoded)**

Group	Count	%
1 <b>Managers/Administrators</b>	89	11
2-3 <b>Professionals/Assoc. Prof.</b>	90	11
4 <b>Clerks/Secretaries</b>	114	14
5-7 <b>Service/Sales/Craft/Police/Fire</b>	68	8
6-8-9 <b>Ag&amp;Fisheries/Machine Op/Elementary</b>	77	9
10 <b>Housewives</b>	126	15
11 <b>Retired</b>	111	13
12-15 <b>Unemployed/Other</b>	59	7
13-14 <b>Students/Educators</b>	105	13


**Chart: Table 39 Occupational groups by Support both/oppose both (Key above)**



Professionals, excluding teachers and principals, show the strongest support for both principles, closely followed by service and sales workers including police and fire fighters. No group shows less than majorities supporting both. A regrouping of occupational groups into public, private, NGO and non-workforce sectors shows the least support for both principles among the non-workforce and civil servants. None of those who work for non-governmental organizations oppose the principles.

**Table 40 Support/oppose CE & Legco direct election by work sector**

	NGO	Civil servant/Quasi-public	Non-workforce	Private sector	total
Support both	67	55	54	60	57
Oppose both	0	9	8	8	8






Nearly one in four Hong Kong permanent residents have lived outside Hong Kong for one year or more. About one in 10 has lived in mainland China for a year or more. (Most were born there and came to Hong Kong as adults, though some Hong Kong born residents have lived on the mainland, mostly in job related assignments. This number is growing. Also about a half million Hong Kong residents live on the mainland, with a quarter of a million traversing the border each day.) About 13 percent have lived a year or more in a democratic country (countries which elect their leadership by direct universal suffrage elections). This overseas experience seems to strengthen both support for both principles and opposition to both principles.

**Table 41 Experience living outside Hong Kong 1 year or more**

Group	Count	%
Mainland China	87	10
None	662	77
UK-US-Can-Aust-Twn-OtherDem	109	13

**Table 42 Experience living outside Hong Kong 1 year or more by support both/oppose both**


	Mainland China	None	UK-US-Can-Aust-Twn-OtherDem	total
Support both	45	57	65	57
Oppose both	7	7	9	8



Nine percent said they had right of abode in another country. Having ROA in another country seems to polarize responses with higher percentages supporting as well as opposing both principles.

**Table 43 Support/oppose both by Right of Abode abroad**


	ROA elsewhere	No ROA	total
Support both	60	56	57
Oppose both	12	7	8



Those who own their flats appear the most opposed in principle to both directly electing the CE and all members of Legco while those who rent private residences are most supportive of both principles.

**Table 44 Type of living quarters by support both/oppose both**

	1-9-10	2	3	4	5	6-7-8	total
Support both	50	58	65	52	57	61	57
Oppose both	0	10	5	7	5	6	8




**KEY: Living Quarters**

Group	Count	%
1-9-10 Villa/Employer provided qtrs/other	24	3
2 Private residence (own)	368	43
3 Private residence (rent)	57	7
4 Home Ownership Scheme	130	15
5 Public housing	247	29
6-7-8 Modern/traditional village house	33	4

Only the two lowest income groups show less than a majority support both principles. Generally, the higher the income level (and education level; education level explains about 47 percent of the variance in income), the greater the support for democracy.

**Table 45 Monthly income groups by Support/oppose CE & Legco direct election**

	1-2	3	4	5	6-7	8-9	10-11	12-to-16	Refuse to say	total
Support both	43	47	56	64	58	59	62	63	56	57
Oppose both	9	9	4	2	7	8	11	8	10	8



**KEY: Income groups (Recoded for analysis. See full breakdown in demographic section)**

Group	Approx. mthly family income	Count	%
1-2	Less than \$5,000	65	8
3	\$5,000-9,999	76	9
4	\$10,000-14,999	113	13
5	\$15,000-19,999	83	10
6-7	\$20,000-29,999	134	16
8-9	\$30,000-39,999	111	13
10-11	\$40,000-59,999	94	11
12-13-14-15-16	\$60,000-100,000+	73	8
Refuse to say		110	13

Clearly, a majority of Hong Kongers support both the direct election of the CE and of all members of Legco, in principle. The key question is when would people prefer to see the principle implemented. To that crucial question we turn in the last part of this section.

#### 4. When to implement principle of direct election

We asked the question in two ways, first a close-ended question, and later in the survey, an open-ended question. The question with closed options showed that a majority of 58 percent supported implementing direct CE elections by 2012.

**Table 46 When would you implement direct election of the Chief Executive? (close ended)**

Group	%
2007	<b>31</b>
2012	<b>27</b>
2017	<b>3</b>
Later election	<b>8</b>
Doesn't matter when	<b>18</b>
<b>Oppose direct election</b>	<b>12</b>





Table 47 shows a variety of responses, but the accumulative graph below makes clear that two thirds support direct election of the CE by 2012 if the decision was left up to them to make.

**Table 47 If you could decide yourself, when would you prefer direct CE election to take place?**

Group	%
2005	<b>2</b>
2006	<b>3</b>
2007	<b>30</b>
2008	<b>5</b>
2009	<b>1</b>
2010	<b>5</b>
2012	<b>20</b>
2015	<b>2</b>
2017	<b>2</b>
2020	<b>1</b>
2047	<b>0.1*</b>
Neutral	<b>17</b>
<b>Oppose direct election</b>	<b>12</b>

\*1 person


**Chart: Table 47 When would you like to see direct CE election take place?**



The question about when respondents would implement direct election of all Legco members shows a majority of 62 percent support implementation by 2012 and two thirds by 2016.

**Table 48 When would you implement direct election of all members of Legco?**

Group	%
2008	43
2012	19
2016	3
Later election	7
DK	9
<b>Oppose direct election</b>	<b>22</b>



A clear majority of 68 percent support a timetable being given for the direct election of all members of Legco while one in five oppose a timeline.

**Table 49 Do you support or oppose a timetable for direct election of all members of Legco?**

Group	%
Strongly support	19
Support	49
Oppose	19
Strongly oppose	3
DK	10

For the effect issuing or promising a timetable would have on support or opposition to the current government proposals on constitutional reforms, see Section V of this report. Section III examines support or opposition to specific aspects of the proposals and likely provisions to be voted on as amendments to the election ordinances for CE and Legco.

### III Public opinion on aspects of the proposals and present system

The first table in this section indicates that, in principle, two thirds support enlarging the CE Election Committee from its present 800 members.

**Table 50 In principle, do you support or oppose to enlarge the CE Election Committee?**

Group	Count	%
Strongly support	109	13
Support	464	54
Oppose	117	14
Strongly oppose	23	3
DK	146	17





Table 51 lays out options on the size and franchise which have been discussed for changing the CE election committee. Only 39 percent support rejecting the government’s expansion proposals and retaining the present arrangements. No option secures a majority of support except universal suffrage direct election by all Hong Kong voters, which 78 percent support.

**Table 51 Would you support or oppose the following positions on the government’s proposals on the CE Election Committee?**

	Strongly support	support	oppose	Strongly oppose	DK
Reject government plan, keep 800 members elected in same manner as 2002	6	31	37	7	18
Approve gov plan for 1,600 but bar 102 appointed District Councilors from vote	5	31	40	4	20
Approve gov plan for 1,600 but abolish corporate vote (1 vote per company) in functional constituencies	4	37	35	3	21
Abolish both corporate voting and ban appointed District Councilors from vote	4	33	38	4	22
Replace with universal suffrage direct election by all Hong Kong voters	34	44	12	3	7

Replace with universal suffrage direct election by a



**Table 52 Which of the five options would you most prefer?**

	Strongly support
Reject government plan, keep 800 members elected in same manner as 2002	4
Approve gov plan for 1,600 but bar 102 appointed District Councilors from vote	7
Approve gov plan for 1,600 but abolish corporate vote (1 vote per company) in functional constituencies	7
Abolish both corporate voting and ban appointed District Councilors from vote	4
Replace with universal suffrage direct election by all Hong Kong voters	68
Don't Know	10

Table 53 shows, if the Election Committee is expanded in size, most support increasing the required nominations to 200 from 100, requiring nominators to come from all four sectors (though not necessarily equally from all four sectors), putting a maximum limit of 400 on the number of nominators to ensure a competitive election, and having Election Committee members vote even if only one candidate is nominated.

**Table 53 If the Election Committee is expanded to 1,600 do you support or oppose:**

	Strongly support	support	oppose	Strongly oppose	DK
Increase # req'd for nomination to 200 from 100 required now	7	49	27	4	13
Require 200 nominators to be from all 4 sectors of politics, business, professional and social	9	64	18	2	7
Put a maximum limit on # of nominators at 400 to ensure several candidates	7	62	20	3	9
Have EC members vote even if only 1 candidate is nominated	11	62	17	2	8

In Table 54, which deals with reform proposals for Legco, only two options have majority support. The plan as proposed to expand Legco to 70 with District Councils returning 5 new functional constituency seats has most support of all options with two thirds in favor. Expanding as proposed but abolishing corporate voting has 51 percent in favor. All the other options fail to get a majority of support, including making no changes and keeping Legco as it is now. None have a majority opposed to them.

**Table 54 Do you support or oppose the following reform proposals government has made for Legco?**

	Strongly support	support	oppose	Strongly oppose	DK
Expand Legco from 60 to 70, with 5 new geographic constituency and 5 new functional constituency members elected by all District Councilors	5	60	16	3	16
Expand Legco but amend to bar appointed District Councilors from voting for 5 new functional seats	4	42	30	3	20
Expand as proposed, but abolish corporate voting where one company has one vote in a functional constituency	5	46	31	2	16
Keep Legco same 60 as now, but abolish corporate voting	3	43	35	3	16
Make no changes to Legco	3	46	32	3	16



Table 55 shows that support for proposals to separate the functional constituencies into a separate house from the geographic or directly elected constituencies has a majority who may now support it (51 percent), possibly up from 47 percent a year ago. Opposition has grown from 22 percent to 27 percent.

**Table 55 Would you support/oppose setting up functional constituency elected representatives into a separate body from geographic constituency elected representatives like the Senate in US or House of Lords in UK?**

	Dec 2004	Nov 2005
Strongly support	4	6
Support	43	45
Oppose	19	23
Strongly oppose	3	4
DK	31	21





Table 56 may indicate that strong support for full direct election of all members of Legco and for direct elections in principle has eroded support for expanding the functional constituency franchises. Whereas a year ago 78 percent supported expanding FC franchises, only 51 percent do so now. Opposition to expansion has more than doubled, from 14 percent in December 2004 to 33 percent now.

**Table 56 Do you support/oppose increasing who has a right to vote in FC elections?**

	Dec 2004	Nov 2005
Strongly support	14	5
Support	64	46
Oppose	12	27
Strongly oppose	2	6
DK	9	17

**Chart: Table 56 Do you support/oppose increasing who has a right to vote in FC elections?**



The extended debates over constitutional reforms seem to have had little effect on the high levels of support for directly electing the Chief Executive but has seen a rise in opposition to directly electing all members of Legco. People seem less interested in details of incremental change focused on the CE Election Committee and far more prefer direct election over any and all other options. However, with Legco there does seem to have been some effect from the extended debate, with about a two to one support for dividing the two sides of Legco into two separate chambers. People seem to be shifting away from the idea of reforming the functional constituencies by expanding who has a right to vote in them. Instead, people clearly support expanding Legco by adding directly elected seats in the geographic constituencies and adding seats returned from the dominantly directly elected District Councils. The changes in opinion about various Legco reforms may be linked to changes in public opinion toward the government, and in particular, toward the Chief Executive after the first SAR CE, Tung Chee-hwa, resigned in mid-term earlier this year. Part IV examines these changes in attitude toward the government and also examines worries about government linked issues such as constitutionally protected freedoms and performance issues such as maintaining social order.

#### **IV Public opinion on government performance and worries**


Donald Tsang, Financial Secretary under Last Governor Chris Patten and Chief Secretary for Administration under Tung Chee-hwa after Anson Chan resigned in April 2001, took over as the new Chief Executive of the Hong Kong SAR in March 2005 when Tung Chee-hwa resigned. In June he was formally “elected” by overwhelming nomination of the 800 member Chief Executive Election Committee to a truncated two year term. The effect of Tsang’s takeover of the top post on attitudes toward the Hong Kong government can only be described as dramatic, as the chart to Table 57 below makes absolutely clear.

**Table 57 Are you currently satisfied/dissatisfied with the general performance of the HK Government?**


	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Feb 93	60	31	9
Aug 93	57	28	15
Feb 94	58	28	14
Aug 94	56	30	14
Feb 95	43	35	22
Sep 95	46	45	9
Feb 96	60	26	15
July 96	67	21	11
Feb 97	73	20	7
June 97	66	27	7
Jan 98	51	35	4
Apr 98	48	41	12
June 98	37	56	7
July 98	42	49	9
Oct 98	42	48	10
April 99	46	43	11
July 99	40	52	7
Nov 99	41	51	8
Apr 2000	39	53	8
Aug 2000	30	61	4
Oct 2000	31	62	6
Nov 2000	35	58	7
Apr 2001	32	58	10
June 2001	37	55	7
July 2001	35	59	5
Nov 2001	24	68	7
Apr 2002	31	60	9
Aug 2002	22	72	6
Nov 2002	23	69	9
June 2003	23	69	8
Nov 2003	20	75	5
Dec 2003	16	79	6
Apr 2004	23	67	10
May 2004	24	68	5
June 2004	20	73	6
July 2004	20	72	8
Aug 2004	25	67	8
Nov 2004	33	61	6
<b>May 2005</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>July 2005</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Nov 2005</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>4</b>

The Chart of Table 57 and the comparative chart from Dr. Robert Chung's Hong Kong University POP (Public Opinion Polling) website indicate that Hong Kong Transition Project surveys show the same pattern of improved attitudes toward the government. At one time the Hong Kong Government published online its regular polls on public opinion, started in 1982, but that practice was suspended by the Home Affairs Bureau under Patrick Ho in August 2003 when dissatisfaction with Tung Chee-hwa hit a peak. (See page 38) As the two surveys show, the HAB may now wish to reconsider its suspension of public release of its regular surveys.

Chart of Table 57 : Satisfaction with performance of Hong Kong Government




市民對特區政府的滿意程度 (按次計算)  
People's Satisfaction with the HKSAR Government (per poll)  
(7/2003 - 11/2005)



Source: HKU POP survey website: [http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/sargperf/sarg/poll/chart\\_new/poll3.gif](http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/sargperf/sarg/poll/chart_new/poll3.gif)

Chart of “latest” Home Affairs Bureau telephone opinion poll, August 2003.




Source: [http://www.hab.gov.hk/file\\_manager/en/documents/whats\\_new/opinion\\_survey/ReportAug03E.pdf](http://www.hab.gov.hk/file_manager/en/documents/whats_new/opinion_survey/ReportAug03E.pdf)

Table 58 shows that satisfaction with life in Hong Kong has rebounded, although still somewhat lower than levels in the colonial period.

**Table 58 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with your life in Hong Kong?**


	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
<b>Nov 91</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>1</b>
Feb 93	85	13	2
Aug 93	88	10	2
Feb 94	88	10	2
Aug 94	87	10	3
Feb 95	86	9	5
Sept 95	80	18	2
Feb 96	85	13	2
July 96	88	10	2
Feb 97	90	9	1
June 97	86	12	2
Jan 98	81	16	3
Apr 98	71	26	3
June 98	68	30	2
July 98	74	25	1
Oct 98	70	27	3
Apr 99	72	24	3
July 99	73	26	1
Nov 99	72	26	2
Apr 2000	65	33	2
Aug 2000	65	31	4
Nov 2000	67	30	3
Apr 2001	61	34	5
June 2001	71	25	4
July 2001	65	32	3
Nov 2001	64	33	3
Apr 2002	66	31	3
Aug 2002	62	34	4
Nov 2002	66	31	3
<b>June 2003</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>3</b>
Nov 2003	51	44	4
Dec 2003	57	39	5
Apr 2004	67	27	5
June 2004	62	35	4
July 2004	55	39	6
Aug 2004	63	32	4
Nov 2004	65	32	4
May 2005	78	20	2
July 2005	78	20	2
Nov 2005	73	23	4



Tsang’s handling of mainland relations show the highest levels of satisfaction ever recorded.

**Table 59 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the Hong Kong Government (SAR government) in dealing with the mainland?**

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Feb 95	21	46	33
Sept 95	23	48	29
Feb 96	30	41	29
July 96	37	38	25
June 97	44	41	15
Jan 98	44	32	24
July 98	61	25	14
Oct 98	57	26	17
July 99	43	42	15
Nov 99	39	46	15
Apr 2000	42	43	15
Aug 2000	42	45	13
Nov 2000	44	43	13
Apr 2001	32	51	17
July 2001	45	42	13
Nov 2001	36	49	16
Apr 2002	46	40	14
Aug 2002	41	42	18
Nov 2002	46	42	11
Feb 2003	33	49	18
June 2003	36	49	15
Nov 2003	49	37	14
April 2004	33	53	14
May 2004	29	57	15
June 2004	30	64	7
July 2004	39	51	10
Aug 2004	46	43	10
Nov 2004	51	40	9
May 2005	64	24	12
Nov 2005	71	21	9




Satisfaction with the central government’s handling of Hong Kong affairs has recovered after a steep drop following the April 2004 NPC Standing Committee intervention that banned direct elections.



**Table 60** Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the PRCG in dealing with Hong Kong affairs?


	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Aug 93	25	54	22
Feb 93	23	56	21
Aug 94	21	63	16
Feb 95	20	60	20
Sept 95	17	62	22
Feb 96	31	49	20
July 96	27	58	15
June 97	45	41	14
Jan 98	61	22	18
Apr 98	67	17	16
June 98	68	17	15
July 98	74	11	15
Oct 98	67	15	17
Apr 99	65	19	16
July 99	60	25	16
Nov 99	57	26	17
Apr 2000	55	31	13
Aug 2000	56	27	15
Nov 2000	50	36	14
Apr 2001	46	34	21
July 2001	57	29	14
Nov 2001	55	26	19
Apr 2002	59	25	17
Aug 2002	57	25	19
June 2003	57	28	16
Nov 2003	72	18	10
Apr 2004	47	37	17
May 2004	37	50	11
June 2004	38	53	9
July 2004	38	50	12
Aug 2004	47	40	12
Nov 2004	55	32	13
May 2005	64	24	11
July 2005	58	29	12
Nov 2005	64	25	10



Violent suppression of villagers in Guangdong province and recurrent outbreaks of bird flu on the mainland appear to have pushed satisfaction with the central government downward since May.

**Table 61** Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the PRCG in ruling China?


	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Feb 93	35	49	16
Aug 93	26	55	19
Feb 94	29	53	18
Aug 94	24	64	12
Feb 95	22	62	16
Sept 95	15	62	24
Feb 96	30	49	22
July 96	28	56	16
Feb 97	38	45	17
June 97	34	51	15
Jan 98	37	39	24
Apr 98	43	34	23
June 98	44	34	22
July 98	52	24	24
Oct 98	53	24	23
Apr 99	49	31	20
July 99	44	28	27
Nov 99	49	31	20
Apr 2000	38	37	24
Aug 2000	47	31	22
Nov 2000	47	29	24
Apr 2001	41	33	26
July 2001	53	28	19
Nov 2001	57	20	24
April 2002	60	18	22
Aug 2002	60	18	22
June 2003	61	22	18
Nov 2003	68	15	17
Apr 2004	58	21	21
May 2004	54	25	19
June 2004	56	28	16
July 2004	59	21	20
Aug 2004	58	25	17
Nov 2004	56	25	19
May 2005	59	23	18
Nov 2005	51	29	19



But back in Hong Kong, Tung's resignation and Tsang's handling of the public appear to have significantly lowered worry about social unrest.

**Table 62 Are you worried/not worried about social unrest in Hong Kong?**


	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	Don't know
Oct 1998	21	27	30	19	3
April 1999	29	32	23	13	2
July 1999	35	29	22	10	3
Nov 1999	25	31	29	12	3
Apr 2000	41	29	19	11	1
Aug 2000	31	31	21	15	1
Nov 2000	41	28	17	14	1
Apr 2001	35	29	19	13	3
July 2001	39	25	20	13	2
Nov 2001	31	23	25	19	1
Aug 2002	21	28	28	20	2
Nov 2002	27	26	26	20	1
Feb 2003	23	32	25	18	3
June 2003	31	31	23	14	2
Apr 2004	35	32	18	10	5
May 2004	35	32	18	12	3
June 2004	34	34	21	10	1
July 2004	37	34	19	8	1
Aug 2004	45	31	15	7	2
Nov 2004	41	29	19	8	3
May 2005	63	19	11	5	2
Nov 2005	59	23	8	8	2



The lowered worry about social unrest also extends to constitutional reform disputes, which show a continuous drop in worry over the past 18 months after high concern post-April 2004's intervention.

**Table 63** Are you worried/not worried about **constitutional reform disputes causing chaos?**


	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	Don't know
April 2004	28	30	23	12	6
May 2004	25	28	24	14	8
June 2004	25	32	26	14	3
July 2004	33	29	23	11	3
Aug 2004	36	31	23	8	3
Nov 2004	40	28	18	7	7
May 2005	42	28	18	7	6
Nov 2005	47	27	14	7	5



Tsang's taking of the reigns has also lowered worries about freedom of the press, with significant drops in the very worried and fairly worried levels, from a combined top of 35 percent in June 2004 following the Standing Committee's intervention to about half that, 16 percent, in November 2005.

**Table 64** Are you currently worried or not worried about: **Free press ?**


	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	DK
Apr 2001	50	25	13	7	5
July 2001	56	21	11	8	3
Nov 2001	53	23	12	8	4
Apr 2002	58	19	12	7	4
Aug 2002	49	26	16	5	4
Nov 2002	46	23	16	12	3
Feb 2003	47	23	16	10	5
Dec 2003	53	24	14	5	4
Apr 2004	46	26	15	10	2
May 2004	39	28	20	12	1
June 2004	36	27	18	17	3
July 2004	42	29	17	10	2
Aug 2004	41	28	20	10	2
Nov 2004	48	24	17	6	3
May 2005	58	25	10	5	2
Nov 2005	57	26	10	6	2



And so the bottom line is that rates of satisfaction with Donald Tsang are at their highest level, well above anything ever polled by Tung Chee-hwa. (See Table 66 for Tung’s ratings for comparison).

**Table 65 Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with performance of C. E. Donald Tsang?**

	Very Dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Very Satisfied	DK
May 2005	1	9	67	9	16
July 2005	1	8	52	6	33
Nov 2005	1	8	72	10	9



**Table 66 Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with performance of C. E. Tung?**

	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	DK
Feb 97	24	53	23
June 97	29	50	21
Jan 98	29	60	11
Apr 98	36	53	11
June 98	47	46	7
July 98	45	49	6
Oct 98	42	46	12
Apr 99	42	50	8
July 99	46	46	8
Nov 99	53	39	8
Apr 2000	54	38	9
Aug 2000	56	32	12
Oct 2000	60	33	7
Nov 2000	56	37	7
Apr 2001	57	31	12
June 2001	54	37	9
July 2001	57	36	6
Nov 2001	65	25	10
Apr 2002	58	33	9
Aug 2002	67	21	11
Nov 2002	66	26	8
June 2003	70	20	8
Nov 2003	73	21	6
Dec 2003	76	16	8
Apr 2004	66	21	13
May 2004	68	23	7
June 2004	76	18	7
*12 July 2004	69	23	8
*17 Aug 2004	73	19	8
*5 Sept 2004	67	24	8
Nov 2004	61	28	11


\*definite voters only

As Table 67 and the accompanying chart show, Tsang rated as better in handling every single category asked about in May 2005.

**Table 67 In comparison with Tung Chee-hwa, how well do you think Donald Tsang is handling relations with: Ranked, Better MAY 2005**

	Rank	Much better	Somewhat better	Same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	DK
Legco	1	5	69	10	3	1	13
Pan-democrat groups	2	4	61	12	3	1	19
Media	3	4	60	17	3	1	15
Public in general	4	4	59	16	5	1	16
Civil service	5	7	55	16	2	1	18
Principal officials	6	4	54	17	5	1	17
People like yourself	7	3	50	21	6	1	19
Beijing	8	3	44	20	16	1	16
Pro-business groups	8	3	44	21	11	2	19
Poor & unemployed	10	2	39	24	5	1	29
Big tycoons	11	3	38	19	13	1	26
Pro-Beijing groups	12	2	37	19	20	1	21
Guangdong/Shenzhen officials	13	2	35	20	14	1	27

**Chart Table 67 Tsang’s handling compared to Tung’s**



Part IV shows that Donald Tsang and the government go into the vote on constitutional reform with a strong hand and fair support for its proposals. Parts I to III show there is strong support for the position of the pan-democrats for direct elections, and significant support and opposition for both the government and the pan-democrats on the government proposals and on the pan-democrat’s demanded revisions. Part V examines the potential fallout if the reform proposals fail.

## V Fallout from failure

The final section of this study examines the blame or fallout from the failure of reforms to pass Legco. The first part of this section examines the views of the three out of four who say they frequently or occasionally discuss politics in contrast with the one in five who say they never discuss politics. The sentiments of those who discuss political affairs with friends are likely to have the most impact on the direction public opinion will take if the reform package fails.

### 1. Views on direct election of politically active and inactive

The reputation that Hong Kongers are politically apathetic, uninterested in reading about or discussing politics clearly has little basis in fact. Only one in five say they never discuss political matters with their friends while one in 10 say they do so frequently. The rest, two thirds, say they occasionally discuss political matters with friends. There is no “silent majority” in Hong Kong. The

vast majority are very much vocal about their views with fully one in ten saying they frequently discuss political matters with friends.

**Table 68 When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?**

Group	Count	%
Never	<b>187</b>	<b>22</b>
Occasionally	<b>579</b>	<b>68</b>
Frequently	<b>87</b>	<b>10</b>

We now examine the views of those who are politically silent with those who are politically active in the sense of discussing their views with friends. The views of the politically vocal are clearly more supportive of direct elections than the politically silent. Those who discuss politics frequently or occasionally support direct elections for the CE by 72 percent versus 59 percent for the politically silent. While 12 percent of the vocal oppose direct CE elections in principle, 16 percent of the silent do so. The effect of this difference is to decrease the effectiveness of opponents to persuade others to their view, while the reverse occurs for supporters of direct CE election.

**Table 69 Support/oppose direct CE election in principle by discuss politics with friends**

	Frequently/occasionally	Never discuss	total
Support	<b>72</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>69</b>
Neutral/DK	<b>17</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>19</b>
Oppose	<b>12</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 11.36 with 2 df p = 0.0034

The same pattern shows among the politically vocal and silent on the issue of support or opposition to direct election of all members of Legco. More of both the silent and vocal support direct election of all members of Legco than support direct CE election and more oppose it, but as with direct CE election, more of the vocal support direct Legco election in principle (75 percent) and fewer oppose it (21 percent) than among the politically silent (63 percent support, 25 percent opposition).

**Table 70 Support/oppose direct Legco election in principle by discuss politics with friends**

	Frequently/occasionally	Never discuss	total
Support	<b>75</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>72</b>
Neutral/DK	<b>4</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>6</b>
Oppose	<b>21</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 23.16 with 2 df p ≤ 0.0001


The contrast between the silent and vocal is even more telling among those who support or oppose both direct CE election and direct election of all members of Legco. While 60 percent of the vocal support both principles, a majority of the silent, 54 percent, oppose both principles.



**Table 71 Support/oppose direct election of both in principle by discuss politics with friends**

	Frequently/occasionally	Never discuss	total
Oppose both	40	54	43
Support both	60	46	57
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 11.41 with 1 df p = 0.0007



The bottom line effect is that those who support direct elections have a disproportionate effect on public opinion since they are the ones more likely to talk about their views with friends. If they turn against the Tsang regime or blame democrats for the failure of progress toward direct elections, the effects on the larger public will likely be significant. The silent will remain silent about their views, but the politically silent are more likely to oppose progress than support it. This silence will lessen the effect of their satisfaction at the failure of progress.

**2. Acceptability of the proposals versus support to pass them in Legco**

The question in Table XX was asked in the full survey in two waves, the first 1-8 November and the second 18-20 November. The second question was asked from 21-23 November in a short follow-up survey questionnaire. While a majority find the proposals as is personally acceptable, the follow-up question indicates that they are evenly divided on whether they support or oppose passing the government’s reform proposals without changes. There is also an indication in the two waves of the main survey that the acceptability of the reform package was decreasing from 62 percent acceptability to 56 percent acceptability as the pro-democracy advocates stepped up their campaign against the package.

**Table 72 Do you find the government’s proposals for reforming the current 800 member Chief Executive Election Committee by expanding it to 1,600 and adding all 529 District Council members acceptable or unacceptable?**

	1-8 Nov N=617	18-20 Nov N=242
Very unacceptable	6	8
Somewhat unacceptable	21	23
Somewhat acceptable	50	47
Very acceptable	12	8
DK	10	14

The follow-up question shifted from whether the package was personally acceptable to respondents to whether they support or oppose Legco members passing it as is. Even the shrinking majority who found it acceptable in mid-November became much less supportive of its passage unchanged toward the end of November.

**Table 73 Do you support or oppose Legco members to pass the government’s reform proposals as they are without changes?**

	21-23 Nov N=403
Strongly support	6
Support	33
Oppose	30
Strongly oppose	7
DK	24

So do these results mean a deadlock in views with neither a majority for or against the package? Apparently so unless changes are made.

The 37 percent of the respondents opposed were asked a follow-up question of “What amendments to the proposals, if made, would change your opposition to support?” Of that 37 percent, about a third (12 percentage points of the whole sample in the table above) indicated that did not know what changes would make them switch from opposition to support. Giving a timeline or a promise to develop a timeline for universal suffrage would swing 13 percentage points of the sample respondents in support, and thus provide a possible majority for the proposals, rendering the results as 52 percent in support while about one in four, 24 percent, remained opposed.<sup>6</sup>

Dropping District Council appointees from the proposal would raise the support level to 55 percent versus about one in five, 21 percent, still opposed, moving support levels into a likely majority (range of error of +/-7 points would mean the support would range from a low of 48 percent to possibly as high as 62 percent) with these changes. The hardcore opponents who demand full direct elections in 2007-08 make up 7 percent of the sample.

<sup>6</sup> A possible majority given the range of error in this small sample of about +/- 7 points.

**Table 74** What amendments to the proposals, if made, would change your opposition to support?

	20-23 Nov N=403	Amendments which would lead to switch to support	Bottom line results of amendments if made
Support	<b>39</b>		<b>39+13=52+3=55</b>
Support if timeline given		<b>13</b>	
Support if no appointees to District Councils		<b>3</b>	
Oppose	<b>37</b>		<b>37-13=24-3=21</b>
DK	<b>24</b>		

Part 3 of this section examines the effects of failure to amend and pass the reform package.

### 3. Who to blame for failure?

As the table below shows, the main losers in failure of the reform proposals to pass will be the Tsang government, the Beijing government and the democratic camp. All show double digit levels of getting a great deal of blame. The DAB, pro-business groups and the Liberal party show relatively small levels of blame will attach to them at this point.


**Table 75** How much blame would you assign the following if the constitutional reform proposals fail to pass Legco? (Ranked by A great deal and Some blame combined)

	A great deal	Some	Very little	None
Donald Tsang	<b>19</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>14</b>
Beijing officials	<b>19</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>20</b>
Raphael Hui	<b>13</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>16</b>
Pro-democracy camp	<b>17</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>19</b>
Democratic party	<b>15</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>15</b>
Pro-government camp	<b>9</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>20</b>
Article 45	<b>11</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>18</b>
DAB	<b>8</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>20</b>
Pro-business groups	<b>7</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>25</b>
Liberal party	<b>7</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>18</b>

Table 76 below regroups the table above into those affixing a great deal or some blame versus those saying very little to none. Only Donald Tsang clearly gets the majority of respondents (58 percent) blaming him for failure of the package. Beijing officials are next in line followed by Raphael Hui, the Chief Secretary for Administration nominally in charge of the package. The pro-democracy camp as a whole is then next, followed by the Democratic party, blamed by 40 percent of respondents.

**Table 76 Reclassified Blame for failure to pass reform**

	A great deal/Some	Very little/None
<b>Donald Tsang</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>42</b>
Beijing officials	46	54
Raphael Hui	45	55
Pro-democracy camp	42	58
Democratic party	40	60
Pro-government camp	39	62
Article 45	34	65
DAB	33	67
Pro-business groups	33	67
Liberal party	31	69



As the tables above show, while Tsang and Beijing are most blamed for failure, the pro-democracy parties do not escape unscathed. The following tables show the effects already of the dispute. In September 2004's Legco election, pro-government parties went to the polls with very high levels of dissatisfaction with their performance.

**Table 77 Satisfaction with performance/DK in Sept 2004 Ranked by dissatisfaction**

Party	Very dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Very satisfied	DK
DAB led by Ma Lik	29	37	16	2	17
FTU by Cheng Yiu-tong	14	31	27	2	27
DP led by Yeung Sum	13	28	40	5	15
LP led by James Tien	8	32	37	2	21
Frontier led by Emily Lau	16	22	40	3	19
NCF by Ma Fung Kwok	6	15	8	1	70
ADPL by Fredrick Fung	5	15	44	5	32
CTU by Lau Chin-shek	5	20	47	4	24
Article 45 by Audrey Eu	6	12	41	16	25

A year on shows that in contrast to September 2004 when all the top three in dissatisfaction were pro-government parties led by the DAB, today the Democratic party is number one in dissatisfaction followed by a much improved DAB and then by the Frontier.

**Table 78 Satisfaction with performance/DK in November 2005**

Party	Very dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Very satisfied	DK
DP led by Lee Wing tat	17	33	32	2	15
DAB led by Ma Lik	16	32	32	1	19
Frontier led by Emily Lau	16	28	34	3	19
LP led by James Tien	11	31	39	2	17
FTU by Cheng Yiu-tong	6	22	47	3	22
Alliance by Abraham Shek	6	21	23	--	50
CTU by Lau Chin-shek	5	20	49	3	22
ADPL by Fredrick Fung	4	16	48	2	30
Article 45 by Audrey Eu	5	16	47	12	20

Removing don't know responses and recoding into satisfied and dissatisfied makes the changes even clearer.

**Table 79 Satisfaction with performance/DK out (5 Sept 2004)** Ranked by dissatisfaction


Party	Dissatisfied with performance	Satisfied with performance	Difference Sept 2004
<b>DAB</b>	79	21	<b>-58</b>
<b>FTU</b>	62	38	<b>-24</b>
<b>Liberal Party</b>	49	51	<b>+2</b>
<b>Democratic Party</b>	48	52	<b>+4</b>
<b>Frontier</b>	47	53	<b>+6</b>
<b>Confed. of Trade Unions</b>	34	66	<b>+32</b>
<b>ADPL</b>	28	72	<b>+44</b>
<b>Article 45 Concern Group</b>	24	76	<b>+52</b>

**Table 80 Satisfaction with performance/DK out (Nov 2005)** Ranked by dissatisfaction

Party	Dissatisfied with performance	Satisfied with performance	Difference Nov 2005
<b>Democratic Party</b>	59	41	<b>-18</b>
<b>DAB</b>	58	42	<b>-16</b>
<b>Frontier</b>	54	46	<b>-8</b>
<b>The Alliance</b>	54	46	<b>-8</b>
<b>Liberal Party</b>	51	49	<b>-2</b>
<b>FTU</b>	36	64	<b>+28</b>
<b>Confed. of Trade Unions</b>	32	68	<b>+36</b>
<b>ADPL</b>	29	71	<b>+42</b>
<b>Article 45</b>	27	73	<b>+46</b>

**Table 81 Ranked according to Aug 2000 most negative to most positive**


	Difference +/- August 2000	Difference +/- September 2004	Difference +/- November 2005
LP led by James Tien	-9	+2	-2
Democratic Party led by Lee Wing-tat	-8	+4	-18
DAB led by Tsang Yok-sing	+2	-58	-16
Frontier led by Emily Lau	+38	+6	-8
FTU led by Cheng Yiu Tong	+40	-24	+28
CTU led by Lau Chin-shek	+58	+32	+36
HKADPL led by Fredrick Fung	+56	+44	+42
Article 45 Concern group	NA	+52	+46



Comparing dissatisfaction before the 2000 Legco election and before the 2004 Legco election to today shows that only the Democratic Party, the Frontier and Article 45 show rises in dissatisfaction from the August 2004 level. Clearly their hardline confrontative stance is having some effect on their standing with the public even prior to the vote on 21 December.

**Table 82 Relative Dissatisfaction with performance of parties, 2000, 2004, 2005 (Ranked 05)**

Party	Dissatisfied August 2000	Dissatisfied August 2004	Dissatisfied Nov 2005
Democratic Party	54	47	59
DAB	49	80	58
Frontier	31	49	54
Liberal Party	54	50	49
Fed of Trade Unions	30	55	36
Confed Trade Unions	21	34	32
ADPL	22	37	29
Article 45	--	25	27



#### 4. Further effects of failure?

The key impact of failure to enact constitutional reforms is on governance. The failures of the Tung government saw a dramatic increase in the public's willingness to take political affairs into their own hands, in the form of demonstrations, petition-signing and survey participation. Table 84 and the chart reclassify the data in Table 83 to make this trend clearer. Table 84 also shows a rise in public contacting their representatives in expressing concern or seeking help. In contrast, there has been no rise in contact of government departments, indicating that one reaction to the Tung failures was to go outside government for help, or to use representatives and direct action to pressure government.

**Table 83 Did you express concern or seek help from any of the following groups in the past 12 months? (% Yes responses only)**

	GOV	DEL	FEL	DC	NPC	MED	KAI	POL	PRO	SIGN	SURV	DONR
July 1996	8	7	1		-	5	6	2	8	44	32	11
June 1997	10	6	1		1	5	7	2	7	43	33	16
Jan 1998	13	3	--		-	6	8	2	5	41	37	18
Oct 1998	12	5	1		1	6	11	3	4	52	48	20
July 1999	10	6	2		1	5	8	3	6	45	40	15
Nov 1999	12	4	3		1	6	10	3	5	51	47	17
Apr 2000	17	5	3		1	6	10	5	5	49	46	17
Nov 2000	12	6	3		--	5	3	1	4	47	46	12
Apr 2001	11	6	3		1	3	2	2	3	36	39	15
Nov 2001	11	4	1	6	1	3	3	1	3	37	37	14
Apr 2002	10	3	1	6	--	4	2	2	2	25	36	14
Nov 2003	10	3	1	7	--	5	2	1	26	45	40	16
June 2004	11	4	2	8	1	3	3	1	25	42	43	15
Nov 2005	11	5	2	10	1	5	4	3	14	47	53	17

KEY	ABBREVIATION
Contact Government Dept.	GOV
Contact Direct Elected Legco rep.	DEL
Contact Legco Funct Rep.	FEL
Contact District Council/Dist officer	DC
Contact Xinhua/China Adviser, NPC	NPC
Contact Mass Media	MED
Contact local group/Kaifong	KAI
Contact pressure/pol. group	POL
Demonstrate/protest	PRO
Signature Campaign	SIGN
Opinion survey	SURV
Donate to pol. party	DONR




Table 84 reclassifies government department contact and liaison office contact as GOVERNMENT. Contact of directly and functionally elected Legco members along with District Councilors are



recoded to REPRESENTATIVES. PRIVATE GROUPS includes local-level groups and Kaifongs, mass media and political groups while DIRECT PARTICIPATION includes protest participation, petition signing and opinion surveys. The chart shows that from Tung’s uncontested “re-election” in April 2002, there was a rise in direct participation, similar to that when the provisional Legco of all appointees was in office from July 1997 to July 1998.

**Table 84 Participation forms reclassified**

	GOVERNMENT	REPRESENTATIVES	PRIVATE GROUPS	DIRECT PARTICIPATION
July 1996	8	8	13	87
June 1997	11	7	14	92
Jan 1998	13	3	16	96
Oct 1998	13	6	20	120
July 1999	11	8	16	100
Nov 1999	13	7	19	115
Apr 2000	18	8	21	112
Nov 2000	12	9	9	105
Apr 2001	12	9	7	90
Nov 2001	12	11	7	88
Apr 2002	10	10	8	75
Nov 2003	10	11	8	101
June 2004	12	14	7	100
Nov 2005	12	17	12	117




Table 85 charts participation in civil society organizations ranging from unions to environmental groups. Civil society has remained strong throughout the SAR period. The vigor of Hong Kong’s civil society has been one of the bulwarks of protection of its freedoms. None of these sectors show more than about one in five participating, but over all 11 types of groups surveyed, nearly everyone participates in at least one category, with many participating in more than one group, particularly among professionals and the more highly educated. It is these groups that also show the greatest willingness to leave if unsuitable change takes place in their lives in Hong Kong, and it is losing these people who by their participation in civic affairs and economic activities make Hong Kong what it is: Asia’s world city.

**Table 85 Have you attended any meetings or activities of one of the following groups in the last six months? (Percentage reporting membership/ attendance/doesn't add to 100)**

	TU	PA	KAI	MAC	CA	POL	CHA	REC	REL	OWC	EVG
Jan 1998	6	8	7	15	3	1	17	6	20		
Oct 1998	5	5	8	10	3	1	16	5	20	12	5
July 1999	5	6	6	8	2	1	13	4	15	11	3
Nov 1999	6	6	5	8	2	1	16	7	16	12	4
Apr 2000	8	10	5	9	2	2	18	6	21	14	5
Nov 2000	6	6	5	6	2	2	16	7	19	14	5
Apr 2001	4	5	5	7	2	2	11	5	17	13	4
Nov 2001	5	6	4	6	2	2	15	7	18	12	5
Apr 2002	5	8	4	6	2	1	15	7	18	12	5
Feb 2003	4	8	6	8	3	3	21	6	20	15	6
Nov 2003	6	8	5	8	2	2	17	7	21	13	6
Apr 2004	6	8	4	7	3	1	16	5	20	15	6
July 2004	5	7	6	10	3	2	17	6	23	16	6
Aug 2004	4	5	6	8	2	2	19	7	22	17	7
Nov 2005	5	6	5	7	3	2	19	6	20	16	7

KEY	ABBREV.
Trade Union	TU
Professional association	PA
Kaifong	KAI
Mutual Aid Committee	MAC
Clan Association	CA
Political/pressure group	POL
Charitable Association	CHA
Recreational & cultural group	REC
Religious group or church	REL
Owner's corporation	OWC
Environmental group	EVG

Hong Kongers have been presented with take it or leave it deals before, first with the Sino-British Declaration in 1984, then with the Basic Law, and now with constitutional reforms. Between 1984 and 1997 roughly 10 percent of the population emigrated, prompting fears in the early 1990s of a brain drain as younger, talented and more educated people went abroad in large numbers. Could such events occur again if democracy continues to be delayed and denied?

There has been no change since the early 1990s in the proportion of people who say they would seek means to leave if Hong Kong changed in ways they found unsuitable.

**Table 86 If HK is no longer suitable to you, would you seek means to leave?**


Group	Count	%
Yes	390	45
Would like to but cannot	23	3
No	406	47
DK	40	5

Recoding the above results to collapse those responding yes and would like to but cannot, and dropping the don't know responses, leaves Hong Kongers exactly divided, 50 percent yes/maybe and 50 percent no, on whether they would seek means to leave Hong Kong if it became unsuitable to

them. Those who would seek to leave show proportionately more support both principles of direct election than those who reply they would not leave.

**Table 87 Leave HK by Support/oppose direct election both CE and all Legco in principle**

	Would leave	Would NOT leave	total
Support both	62	53	57
Oppose both	5	10	8



When asked for the major change which they would find would make them seek to leave, most indicated political instability, which has always been a codeword among pro-Beijing proponents as the reason for stifling direct elections. In this case, however, it might mean something different.

**Table 88 What is the MAJOR change you find so unsuitable as to make you seek to leave?**

Group	Count	%
Personal standard of living	55	6
Way of life (eg, freedom)	47	5
Family prospects	45	5
HK's economic prospects	72	8
HK's political instability	87	10
Corruption	4	0.5
Air/water pollution	36	4
Overcrowding	15	2
Other	36	4
DK	16	2
<b>Would not leave</b>	<b>446</b>	<b>52</b>

Dropping would not leave and don't know responses above, and reclassifying into political, economic and quality of life categories (includes air/water pollution and overcrowding) gives the following breakdown. The second reclassification re-includes those who would not leave.

**Table 89 Reclassified MAJOR change**

Group	Count	%
Economic	172	48
Political	138	38
Quality of life	51	14


**Table 90 Reclassified MAJOR change with Not leave HK**

Group	Count	%
Economic	172	21
Political	138	17
Quality of life	51	6
Not leave	446	55

The not leave proportion rises from 50 percent due to some who say they would leave indicating they don't know what change would prompt them to go, they just know it when they see it. Those who support both directly electing the CE and all Legco members among those who say they would leave considerably outweighs support among those who say they would not leave. However, even so, a majority of non-leavers support direct elections in principle. Frustrating the development of democracy in Hong Kong would raise propensity for the younger and better educated to leave, but it would do little to reduce the majority who support direct elections. Indeed, since pro-democracy advocates leaving would likely have a negative economic effect on the city, support for direct election might rise among those remaining. The negative effect of their departure is clear once the demographic characteristics of those remaining who oppose direct elections in principle is recalled: Over 60, retired, poorly educated, and lower income.

**Table 91 Reasons to leave HK by Support/oppose both CE and all Legco direct elections**

	Economic	Political	Quality of life	Not leave	total
Support both	61	68	63	52	57
Oppose both	4	4	2	10	7



In sum, a definite majority of Hong Kongers support direct elections for both the Chief Executive and Legco, want those elections to take place by 2012, and will blame Donald Tsang, Beijing and the democrats if steps forward toward full democracy fail to be made. While they are much happier with Tsang's performance so far than ever with Tung, and much more satisfied with the performance of the government under Tsang, a repeat of governance failures of the past under Tsang or a successor, would very likely have the effect of souring Hong Kongers on the partially democratic system and on life in Hong Kong as much, or possibly more, than they became under the hapless first Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa. Fully half the population state they are willing to leave if circumstances do not suit them. Many of the youngest and best educated in the past 20 years have done so, while disproportionately large numbers of the professionals and those most active in civil society remain poised to do so. Clearly public sentiment can shift substantially very rapidly, as several of the trend charts in this report amply demonstrate. And just as certainly the demand for democracy has persisted in good economic times and bad, under Tung and Tsang, under British rule and under Beijing. The issue will not go away. A promise of full universal suffrage elections has been made in the Basic Law. Hong Kong people expect it to be kept. And they are getting impatient.

**DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE NOVEMBER 2005 SAMPLE**

**Table 92 SEX**

Group	Count	%
Male	<b>414</b>	<b>48</b>
Female	<b>445</b>	<b>52</b>

**Table 93 AGE**

Group	Count	%
18-19	<b>52</b>	<b>6.2</b>
20-29	<b>140</b>	<b>16.6</b>
30-39	<b>153</b>	<b>18.2</b>
40-49	<b>216</b>	<b>25.7</b>
50-59	<b>166</b>	<b>19.7</b>
60-69	<b>69</b>	<b>8.2</b>
70-83	<b>46</b>	<b>5.4</b>

**Table 94 IDENTITY**

Group	Count	%
Chinese	<b>252</b>	<b>29</b>
HK Chinese	<b>231</b>	<b>27</b>
HK Person	<b>331</b>	<b>39</b>
HK British	<b>19</b>	<b>2</b>
Overseas Chinese	<b>14</b>	<b>2</b>
Other	<b>12</b>	<b>1</b>

**Table 95 MARITAL STATUS**

Group	Count	%
Never married	<b>284</b>	<b>33</b>
Married	<b>559</b>	<b>65</b>
Widowed	<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>
Divorced	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>

**Table 96 RELIGION**

Group	Count	%
None	<b>475</b>	<b>55</b>
Catholic	<b>51</b>	<b>6</b>
Protestant	<b>112</b>	<b>13</b>
Buddhist	<b>58</b>	<b>7</b>
Taoist	<b>4</b>	<b>.5</b>
Ancestor worship	<b>155</b>	<b>18</b>
Other	<b>4</b>	<b>.5</b>

**Table 97 Religion reclassified**

Group	Count	%
None	475	56
Christian	163	19
Buddhist/Taoist	62	7
Other	155	18

**Table 98 EDUCATION**

Group	Count	%
None	21	2
Primary 1	13	2
Primary 2	4	0.5
Primary 3	7	1
Primary 4	2	0.2
Primary 5	4	0.5
Primary 6	42	5
Form 1	14	2
Form 2	7	1
Form 3	87	10
Form 4/Tech Institute 1 <sup>st</sup> year	20	2
Form 5/Tech Institute graduate	257	30
Form 6 Tech Institute F5 1st yr	26	3
Form 7 Tech college grad/US 1	89	10
University 1st year/US 2	16	2
University 2 <sup>nd</sup> year/US 3	13	2
University graduate	207	24
Masters/Ph.D.	24	3

**Table 99 Education groups Reclassified**

Group	Count	%
0-6	93	11
F1-F4	128	15
F5	257	30
F6-Univ2/US3	144	17
Univ grad	207	24
Univ Post-grad	24	3

**Table 100 WORK SECTOR**

Group	Count	%
Non-governmental Organizations	18	2
Civil servant/Quasi-public	82	10
Non-workforce	355	42
Private sector	394	46

**Table 101 OCCUPATION**

Group	Count	%
Manager/Admin	89	11
Professionals	64	8
Assoc/cert professionals	26	3
Clerks/Secretaries	114	14
Service/sales/police/fire	55	7
Skilled agri & fisheries	5	1
Craft & performers	13	2
Plant & machine operators	36	4
Elementary occupations	36	4
Housewives	126	15
Retired	111	13
Unemployed	35	4
Student	83	10
Teachers/principals incl univ	22	3
Other	24	3

**Table 102 LIVING QUARTERS**

Group	Count	%
Villa/Bungalow	5	1
Private resident (own)	368	43
Private resident (rent)	57	7
Home ownership scheme	130	15
Public housing	247	29
Modern village house	17	2
Traditional village house	15	2
Temporary housing	1	0.1
Employer provided qtrs	8	1
Other	11	1

**Table 103 EXPERIENCE LIVING OUTSIDE HONG KONG**

Group	Count	%
Mainland China	87	10
None	662	77
UK-US-Can-Aust-Twn-OtherDem	109	13

**Table 104 RIGHT OF ABODE**

Group	Count	%
Yes	78	9
No	775	91



**Table 105 APPROX MONTHLY FAMILY INCOME\***

Group	Count	%
None	41	5
Under \$5000	24	3
\$5,000-9,999	76	10
\$10,000-14,999	113	15
\$15,000-19,999	83	11
\$20,000-24,999	93	12
\$25,000-29,999	41	5
\$30,000-34,999	81	11
\$35,000-39,999	30	4
\$40,000-49,999**	49	7
\$50,000-59,999	45	6
\$60,000-69,999	13	2
\$70,000-79,999	14	2
\$80,000-89,999	8	1
\$90,000-99,999	9	1
100,000 and up	29	4

\*13 percent of the sample refused to give an income. These have been excluded in the table above.

\*\*Note change in increments from 5,000 to 10,000.

Mean \$22,500

Median \$20,000-24,999

At the 95% confidence level, range of error is plus or minus 3 points for surveys 900-1,000 respondents and 4 points for those 600-800. Completion rates for the surveys range from 28% to 32% of those contacted by telephone. Since the project uses a Kish table to randomly identify the correspondents desired and then schedules a callback if that specific respondent is not at home, the completion rate tends to be lower but the randomization of responses (needed for accurate statistics) tends to be higher than surveys which interview readily available respondents using the next birthday method. Older respondents with this method tend to use traditional Chinese calendar where all “birthdays” are celebrated on the second day of the lunar new year, thus degrading randomization dependent on this method (in lunar calendar using societies in Asia). Respondents are interviewed in Cantonese, Mandarin, English, Hakka and other languages or dialects as they prefer and as interviewers with the language skills needed are available. Other surveys referred to above are Hong Kong Transition Project surveys. The details of those surveys and reports of same may be found on the Hong Kong Transition Project website at <http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktip>

The number of respondents in the HKTP surveys:

N=	Nov 91	902						
	Feb 93	615	Aug 93	609				
	Feb 94	636	Aug 94	640				
	Feb 95	647	Aug 95	645				
	Feb 96	627	July 96	928			Dec 96	326
	Feb 97	546	June 97	1,129				
	Jan 98	700	April 98	852	June 98	625	July 98	647
	Apr 99	838	July 99	815			Oct 98	811
	Apr 00	704	Aug 00	625;	Aug 00	1059	Oct 00	721
	Apr 01	830	June 01	808	Jul (media )	831	Jul (party)	1029
	Apr 02	751	Aug 02	721			Nov 00	801
	Mar 03	790	June 03	776			Nov 01	759
	Apr 04	809	May 04	833	June 04*	680	July 04 *	955
					Sept 04*		July 04*	695
					July 05	810	Nov 04	773
							Dec 04	800
	May 05	829	May FC**	376			Nov 05	859
							Aug 04*	781
							Dec FC**	405 (365)

\*permanent residents, registered voters only (part of a special 2004 election series)

\*\*Functional constituency registered voters (voters in September 2004 Legco election)